For many South Africans, holding people accountable for corruption means investigating and prosecuting those responsible. Understandably so. Serious corruption is a crime, and successful prosecutions are essential to upholding the rule of law and combatting impunity.

But criminal prosecution is a difficult, slow and inherently limited means of dealing with graft.

Complex cases typically involve huge amounts of financial and digital evidence, many accused, complicated corporate structures and transactions across national jurisdictions. Successful prosecution needs good investigations, forensic expertise, international cooperation and functioning courts.

South Africa’s capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption cases is constrained. In August, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts highlighted a vacancy rate of almost 50% in the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks) and difficulties retaining experienced investigators and forensic specialists. It expressed concern about the many corruption referrals that had not resulted in prosecutions.

Those implicated in major corruption may also have considerable resources to repeatedly challenge proceedings. South African courts have referred to ‘Stalingrad’ litigation tactics, which see wealthy accused contesting virtually every step of a prosecution. In the Jacob Zuma arms deal litigation – underway for over two decades – the Supreme Court of Appeal observed that such a strategy benefitted an accused able to secure the best lawyers.

Criminal prosecution is a difficult, slow and inherently limited means of dealing with graft

A more fundamental limitation is that prosecution is almost always retrospective. By the time someone is convicted, the bribe has been paid, the contract manipulated, the money hidden or the public institution damaged.

Harm caused by corruption can also be difficult to remedy. Who should be compensated when graft contributes to a dysfunctional hospital, poor schooling or unreliable water supply? Corruption degrades public services, weakens institutions and erodes confidence in government and the rule of law. A conviction years later cannot undo the damage.

South Africa must fight corruption further upstream, using preventive measures to intervene earlier, stop wrongdoing and limit its consequences.

Preliminary Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research shows that state institutions possess an array of administrative, regulatory, financial, disciplinary and civil powers that can be used to combat corruption. Many can be exercised without a criminal conviction, and some do not depend on a criminal case being brought at all.

When corruption is uncovered, the immediate question should not simply be whether someone can eventually be prosecuted. It should also be what can lawfully be done now to stop the wrongdoing and prevent further harm.

Consider a suspicious financial transaction. When the statutory requirements are met, the Financial Intelligence Centre can direct an institution not to proceed with a transaction for up to 10 days while it makes inquiries.

The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) can institute civil proceedings to recover state losses and prevent potential losses. The Special Tribunal, which adjudicates civil proceedings arising from SIU investigations, can grant suspension orders and interdicts that halt disputed contracts or other conduct while a case is being decided. An unlawful contract can potentially be stopped without waiting for a corruption prosecution.

In 2025/26, contracts worth over US$1.5 billion were set aside through SIU-initiated court proceedings

Financial regulators such as the Financial Sector Conduct Authority and Prudential Authority can restrict activities, suspend or revoke licences and remove or debar individuals from parts of the financial sector.

The Auditor-General also has corrective and preventive powers. A material irregularity can be referred for investigation and trigger remedial action. If a failure to take action by those responsible for a public institution’s financial management results in financial loss, the Auditor-General can issue a certificate of debt requiring repayment to the state.

National Treasury, meanwhile, manages the List of Restricted Suppliers and Register for Tender Defaulters. Restricting access to public procurement can prevent a prohibited supplier from simply moving on to the next government contract.

So, if South Africa has so many institutions with significant powers, why have they not been used more effectively against pervasive corruption?

Fragmentation is one reason, as powers are dispersed across institutions with varying mandates, priorities and capacity. Information does not always flow easily between them.

The National Anti-Corruption Strategy identified over 30 government departments, parliamentary bodies and coordinating mechanisms with responsibilities for preventing and fighting corruption. The National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council recommended retaining this system, while strengthening coordination and collaboration between its many parts.

Initiatives such as the ISS’ Anti-Corruption Tracker Information System can identify patterns of corruption and institutional responses, informing earlier intervention. But better information alone cannot ensure that institutions act.

Several responses may proceed in parallel rather than deferring action until a criminal case starts

Recent testimony before the Madlanga Commission exposed some of these difficulties. Public Service Commission Chairperson Somadoda Fikeni testified in September that just three or four officials were responsible for verifying the financial disclosures of approximately 10 000 senior public servants. Fikeni also described weaknesses in vetting and lifestyle audits, including resource shortages, delays and failures to act on warning signs.

Legal powers mean little if the institutions entrusted with them lack the capacity or willingness to act. Even when oversight bodies uncover wrongdoing, their findings may lead nowhere if the bodies receiving their referrals do not respond. Those failures should themselves attract scrutiny.

Some institutions are moving beyond identifying and reporting wrongdoing to actively disrupting it. SIU figures reveal that its 2025/26 financial year interventions prevented roughly R1.9 billion (US$115 million) in state losses and led to contracts worth over R25.7 billion (US$1.5 billion) being set aside through court proceedings.

Instead of asking which institution ‘owns’ a corruption matter, we should ask which institutions have relevant powers and what each can lawfully do. The same conduct may raise criminal, tax, procurement, regulatory, disciplinary and civil issues. Subject to the law, several responses may sometimes proceed in parallel rather than deferring action until a criminal case starts.

South Africa does not need to wait for more criminal convictions before acting against corruption. Much of the legal authority to intervene exists. What is needed is the institutional capacity, leadership and political will to use it. And when those entrusted with these powers fail to act, they must be held accountable.

This article was originally posted on issafrica.org and is republished here under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.